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Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans Apart  (CAPTCHAs) are now an almost standard security mechanisms for defending against 
undesirable and malicious bot programs on the In-
ternet (especially those bots that can sign up for 
thousands of accounts a minute with free email ser-
vice providers, send out thousands of spam messages 
in an instant, or post numerous comments in blogs 
pointing both readers and search engines to irrele-
vant sites). CAPTCHAs generate and grade tests that 
most humans can pass but current computer pro-
grams can’t.1 Such tests—often called  CAPTCHA 
challenges—are based on hard, open artificial intel-
ligence problems. 
To date, the most commonly used CAPTCHAs 
are text-based, in which the challenge appears as an 
image of distorted text that the user must decipher 
and retype. These schemes typically exploit the dif-
ficulty for state-of-the-art computer programs to rec-
ognize distorted text. Well-known examples include 
EZ-Gimpy, Gimpy, and Gimpy-r,1 all developed at 
Carnegie Mellon University; Google, Microsoft, and 
Yahoo have also developed and deployed their own 
text CAPTCHAs. Many more schemes have been put 
into practice, but they’re less visible in the literature. 
The “Related Work in CAPTCHA Design and Se-
curity” sidebar highlights additional efforts in the re-
search community.
A good CAPTCHA must not only be human 
friendly but also robust enough to resist computer 
programs that attackers write to automatically pass 
CAPTCHA tests.  However, designing CAPTCHAs 
that exhibit both 
good  robustness 
and usability is much harder than it might seem. The 
current collective understanding of this topic is very 
limited, as suggested by the fact that many well-known 
schemes break. In particular, we recently found that 
we could break a widely deployed CAPTCHA—
carefully designed and tuned by Microsoft—with a 
success rate of higher than 60 percent, even though 
its design goal was that automated attacks shouldn’t 
achieve a success rate of higher than 0.01 percent.2 
We expect that CAPTCHA will go through the same 
process of evolutionary development as cryptography, 
digital watermarking, and the like, with an iterative 
process in which successful attacks lead to the devel-
opment of more robust systems.
In this article, we study the strength of a 
 CAPTCHA presented in a recent paper3 and de-
ployed on the Internet. We show that although this 
scheme effectively resisted one of the best optical 
character recognition (OCR) programs on the mar-
ket, we could break it with a success rate of higher 
than 90 percent using a simple but novel attack that 
takes less than 50 ms on an ordinary desktop com-
puter for decoding each challenge. In a nutshell, we 
found that simply counting the pixels in a CAPT-
CHA’s characters can be a very powerful attack.
Our Target CAPTCHA 
Our target CAPTCHA is the word-image scheme 
deployed at http://captchaservice.org, a publicly avail-
able Web service designed to generate CAPTCHA 
challenges. In a recent paper,3 the scheme’s creator, 
A simple but novel attack can break some CAPTCHAs 
with a success rate higher than 90 percent. In contrast to 
early work that relied on sophisticated computer vision 
or machine learning techniques, the authors used simple 
pattern recognition algorithms to exploit fatal design 
errors.
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Tim Converse (a technical manager at Yahoo), dis-
cussed the design of both this Web service and all the 
CAPTCHAs it supported.
Figure 1 shows the example challenges the target 
scheme generated. Using Converse’s paper and the 
100 random samples we collected for a sample set, 
we observed that this CAPTCHA had the following 
characteristics:
The challenge was always a distorted image of a six-•	
letter English word randomly chosen from a fixed 
set of 6,000 words.
The distortion method used was a random shearing •	
technique. As Converse described, “the initial im-
age of text is distorted by randomly shearing it both 
vertically and horizontally. That is, the pixels in 
each column of the image are translated up or down 
by an amount that varies randomly yet smoothly 
from one column to the next. Then, the same kind 
of translation is applied to each row of pixels (with a 
smaller amount of translation on average).”3 
There were only two colors in each challenge image •	
(PNG format), one for background and the other 
for foreground, which was the distorted challenge 
text. The choice of colors was either user specified 
or randomly created by the CAPTCHA. 
Each challenge used only capital letters. •	
Letters in a challenge might overlap when projected •	
vertically but rarely connected with each other.
To benchmark how resistant this scheme was to 
OCR software attacks, we tested the sample set with 
ABBYY FineReader V.8, one of the best-quality 
commercial OCR products on the market. We per-
formed two attacks: feeding each sample into the 
OCR software for automated recognition and manu-
S everal pioneering efforts in the research community explore how to design text CAPTCHAs properly.1–5 
Greg Mori and Jitendra Malik6 broke two early simple 
 CAPTCHAs—EZ-Gimpy (with 92 percent success) and Gimpy (33 
percent success)—with sophisticated object recognition algo-
rithms. Gabriel Moy and his colleagues7 developed distortion es-
timation techniques to break EZ-Gimpy with a success rate of 99 
percent and four-letter Gimpy-r with a success rate of 78 percent. 
Kumar Chellapilla and Patrice Simard4 attacked several CAPT-
CHAs taken from the Web by using machine-learning algorithms, 
achieving a success rate of from 4.89 to 66.2 percent. 
PWNtcha is an excellent Web page that aims to “demonstrate 
the inefficiency of many CAPTCHA implementations” (http://
sam.zoy.org/pwntcha). It briefly comments on the weaknesses of 
roughly a dozen text-based CAPTCHAs, which this site claimed to 
break with a success ranging from 49 to 100 percent. However, 
no technical details about the attacks are publicly available.
Most recently, we developed effective low-cost attacks on 
CAPTCHAs deployed by Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google,8 although 
PWNtcha considered two of the schemes “very good” and dif-
ficult to break.
Protocol-level attacks on CAPTCHAs, together with their 
limitations of defending against bots, appear in the literature,9 as 
does a recent survey on CAPTCHA research.10
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Figure 1. Example challenges. The target CAPTCHA generated English 
words in capital letters.
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ally segmenting each sample and then letting the soft-
ware recognize individual characters. 
In the first attack, the OCR software couldn’t com-
pletely recognize any of the samples. For 67 of them, 
it recognized no characters, whereas for the remain-
ing 33, it partially recognized between one and four 
characters (see Figure 2a).4 As Figure 2b shows, in the 
second attack, the software recognized 38 percent of 
the individual letters (128 out of 600) but recognized 
all six letters in only one sample (in one other and the 
only other sample, it recognized five of the letters). 
This isn’t surprising, given that the recognition rate for 
individual letters theoretically implies a success rate of 
just 0.3 percent (.38) for breaking this scheme.5,6 So, 
it seems that random shearing distortion provides rea-
sonable resistance to OCR software attacks. 
A Novel Attack 
Although our target CAPTCHA appeared to be se-
cure, as shown in the previous section, we broke it with 
a high success rate using a novel attack that consisted of 
a basic attack algorithm and several refinements.
Basic Attack 
We based our attack on the following key insights that 
we obtained by analyzing the samples we collected:
Most pixels in each challenge were of the back-•	
ground color—that is, the background color was 
dominant, and any pixel of a different color value 
in the image appeared in the foreground (as part of 
the challenge text). So, a program could easily and 
automatically extract the challenge text. 
Many challenges were vulnerable to a vertical seg-•	
mentation attack (which we explain in more detail 
later); a program could vertically divide challenge 
images into segments that each contained a single 
character.
Although a letter might be distorted into a different •	
shape each time, it comprised a constant number of 
foreground pixels in the challenge image—that is, 
each letter had a constant pixel count. We worked out 
the pixel count for each letter from A to Z (see Table 
1) and found that most had a distinct pixel count.
Our basic attack first used the vertical segmenta-
tion method, a standard technique that maps an image 
to a histogram representing the number of foreground 
pixels per column in the image. Then, we used verti-
cal segmentation lines to separate the image by cut-
ting through columns with no foreground pixels at 
all. Figure 3a shows that this method correctly cuts a 
challenge into six segments.
Once we segmented the challenge, our attack sim-
ply counted the number of foreground pixels in each 
segment. Then, we use the pixel count of each seg-
ment to look up Table 1 to determine the letter in the 
segment (see Figure 3b).
This basic attack achieved a success rate of 36 per-
cent on the sample set—that is, it could completely 
recognize 36 out of the 100 sample challenges. 
Dictionary Attack 
Naturally, our basic attack failed to completely recog-
nize some challenges. Figure 4 gives a failing example, 
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Figure 2. Resistance to optical character recognition attacks. In (a) the first attack, we fed each sample into the OCR software for 
automated recognition, and in (b) the second attack, we manually segmented each sample before letting the software recognize 
individual characters.
Table 1. A letter-pixel count lookup table for letters  
A to Z.*
LeTTeR PixeL counT LeTTeR PixeL counT
A 183 N 239
B 217 O 178
C 159 P 162
D 192 Q 229
E 163 R 208
F 133 S 194
G 190 T 175
H 186 U 164
I 121 V 162
J 111 W 234
K 178 X 181
L 111 Y 153
M 233 Z 193
*J and L have the same pixel count; so do K and O, and P and V.
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in which the vertical segmentation method couldn’t 
separate the letters S and K because a vertical slicing 
line couldn’t split the letters without touching both of 
them. Our basic attack couldn’t do anything more than 
give a partially recognized result “FRI**Y” (we use an 
asterisk to represent each unrecognized character). 
However, because the target CAPTCHA used 
English words, we found that we could enhance our 
basic attack by using a dictionary attack as follows. We 
first compiled a dictionary of roughly 6,000 six-letter 
English words. We used any partial result that the ba-
sic algorithm returned as a string pattern to identify 
candidate words in the dictionary that matched the 
pattern. Because multiple candidate words could ex-
ist, we introduced a simple solution to find the best 
possible result: for each dictionary entry, we precom-
puted (using Table 1) a pixel sum—the total number 
of pixels this word could have when embedded in a 
CAPTCHA challenge—and stored it along with the 
word in the dictionary. We also worked out, on the 
fly, a pixel sum for the unbroken challenge, which is 
the total number of all foreground pixels in the chal-
lenge. Our enhanced attack returned the first candi-
date word with the same pixel sum as the challenge as 
the final recognition result. 
Figure 5 illustrates how the enhanced algo-
rithm works. In this case, it used the partial result 
“FRI**Y” that the basic algorithm obtained to 
identify all words that start with “FRI” and end 
with “Y” in the dictionary and found five candidate 
words: FRIARY, FRILLY, FRISKY, FRIZZY, and 
FRIDAY. However, it returned “FRISKY” as the 
best possible result because it was the only candi-
date that had a precomputed pixel sum of 987, which 
equals the unbroken challenge’s pixel sum (133 + 
208 + 121 + 372 + 153 = 987). 
To make the dictionary attack work properly, it’s 
crucial to create the correct string pattern after the 
vertical segmentation process. For example, when the 
vertical segmentation divided an image into only four 
segments, and the corresponding partial result was in 
the form of “B□B□,” we needed to determine how 
many unrecognized letters were in each box “□.” 
Otherwise, “B*B***,” “B**B**,” or “B***B*” 
would give totally different recognition results. On 
the other hand, if we used all these patterns, a lookup 
in the dictionary would likely find too many candi-
date words with an identical pixel sum. 
This is exactly a problem of indexing letters in 
their correct positions; our solution involved a two-
step method:
In some cases, it was trivial to work out a string 1. 
pattern using contextual information. For in-
stance, if a segmented image contained only one 
unrecognized segment, such as the example in 
(a) (b)
Segments-to-characters mapping
163175178233163208
Segmented
Recognized word
Number of
foreground pixels
per segment
ETOMER
Figure 3. Our basic attack. We used (a) vertical histogram segmentation to 
cut a challenge image into six segments or letters and (b) table lookup to 
determine those letters.
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163372121208133
Y**IRF
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Recognized word
Number of
foreground pixels
per segmentInputimage
Figure 4. A failing example. Our basic attack couldn’t completely recognize 
all the characters in some challenges. The partial line between S and K here 
is for illustration only; it didn’t exist in the segmented result.
153121208133
Y**IRF
Recognized
word
Foreground pixel
count per segment
Input image
All candidates words
Segmentation
process
Dictionary
FRIARY
FRILLY
FRISKY
FRIZZY
FRIDAY
Candidates
1,006
837
987
1,001
990
Pixel sum
Segments to
characters mapping
FRISKY
Recognition result
Pixel sum matching
372
Figure 5. The basic attack with two enhancements. With the aid of a 
dictionary, the enhanced algorithm searches for six-letter English words 
that match up with unbroken challenge’s pixel sum.
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Figure 5, the number of unrecognized charac-
ters in the segment was six minus the number 
of all recognized characters. Another straightfor-
ward case was when our basic attack algorithm 
didn’t recognize any characters in an image, 
which meant that the number of unrecognized 
segments in the image didn’t really matter. For 
example, an image segmented into three unrec-
ognized segments “□□□” would be no differ-
ent than one for which the vertical segmentation 
completely failed.
When this first method didn’t work, such as in 2. 
the case of “B□B□,” we relied on the number 
of pixels in each unrecognized segment to deduce 
how many characters the segment contained. For 
instance, when the number of pixels in a segment 
was larger than 239 (the largest pixel count in Ta-
ble 1, which was for the letter N) but smaller than 
2 × 239, this segment likely had two unrecognized 
letters. Some exceptions couldn’t be handled this 
way; although the average pixel count for letters 
A to Z was 178.80, J, L, and I had a pixel count 
much smaller than the average. For example, the 
pixel sum of “ILL” or “LIL” was only 343 and a 
mere 232 for “LI” or “IL.” We used an excep-
tion list to handle such cases. On the other hand, 
the combinations “LLL,” “JK,” and “KJ” never or 
rarely occur in English words. 
An alternative to pixel sum matching was to use un-
recognized segments only. In this way, we wouldn’t 
store any pixel sums in the dictionary, but more com-
putation would be required on the fly.
It’s also worth noting that when the basic algorithm 
couldn’t recognize any of the letters in a challenge, the 
dictionary attack’s pixel sum matching method could 
serve as a last resort. 
Further Enhancements 
We experienced some “troublemakers” in the sample 
set that the previously described techniques couldn’t 
break, so we devised some additional methods to han-
dle them. 
Letters with an identical pixel count. Letters hav-
ing an identical pixel count could confuse our basic 
algorithm—for example, our algorithm initially rec-
ognized one challenge as “OELLEY,” although the 
correct answer should be “KELLEY.” Because O and 
K have the same pixel count, our basic algorithm had 
just a 50 percent of chance of breaking this challenge. 
To overcome this problem, we relied on the fol-
lowing “spelling check”: if a challenge includes a let-
ter with a pixel count of 111 ( J or L), 178 (K or O), 
or 162 (P or V), for each likelihood we generate a 
variant and then perform multiple dictionary lookups 
to rule out candidate strings that aren’t proper words. 
In this case, our attack looked up both “OELLEY” 
and “KELLEY” in the dictionary, and because it only 
found “KELLEY,” this result was returned as the best 
possible answer. 
We also used this spelling check to enhance the 
dictionary attack algorithm’s string pattern match-
ing—for example, if the basic algorithm recognized a 
partial result as “V*B*IC,” then both “V*B*IC” and 
“P*B*IC” would be valid matching patterns for iden-
tifying candidate words in the dictionary. 
Broken characters. Some challenges contained bro-
ken letters that misled the segmentation algorithm—
for instance, it could segment a letter into two parts 
instead of one, due to a crack in the letter. 
To overcome this problem, we introduced a two-
step method as follows. First, once the vertical seg-
mentation process finished, our algorithm tested 
whether a segment was complete: if the number of 
foreground pixels in a segment was smaller than 111 
(the smallest pixel count in Table 1), then this segment 
was incomplete; if the number of foreground pixels 
in a segment was larger than 111 but smaller than 239 
(the largest pixel count in Table 1, that is, the letter 
N) and the algorithm couldn’t find this number in the 
lookup table, then this segment was incomplete. Sec-
ond, we would try to merge an incomplete segment 
with its neighboring segments. A proper merging was 
one for which the combined pixel count could lead 
to a meaningful recognition result—for instance, the 
combined count was equal to or less than 239, and 
appeared in the lookup table. When multiple proper 
combinations existed (for example, when segment 3 
could be combined with either segment 2 or 4), the 
spelling check served as a last resort for finding the 
best possible result. 
Additional pixels. In some cases, a letter might con-
tain additional pixels against its pixel count in the 
lookup table. To address this problem, we relied on 
an approximate table lookup: when we couldn’t find 
a pixel count in the lookup table for a segment, we 
recognized this segment as the most likely letter. 
This method didn’t succeed all the time because 
some letters had close pixel counts (such as V, E, and 
U; D, Z, and S; and M and W). However, sometimes, 
we could resort to the spelling check technique to get 
the correct answer. For example, when the approxi-
mate method returned multiple candidate answers, 
we could use spelling check to choose the best pos-
sible solution.
Results
With all these enhancements, our attack achieved a 
success rate of 92 percent on the sample set. To check 
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whether our attack was generic enough, we followed a 
common practice in computer vision communities.5,6 
Specifically, we collected another set of 100 random 
challenges and then ran our attacks on this new test 
set; we didn’t analyze any challenges in the test set, 
nor did we make any additional modifications to our 
program. Our attack completely broke 94 challenges 
in the test set (which gives a success rate of 94 percent). 
To put this in perspective, an adversary with access 
to the CAPTCHA’s dictionary would have merely a 
1/6,000 chance of guessing correctly without using 
our attack. 
We implemented our attacks in Java (we spent little 
effort optimizing the code’s runtime) and tested it on 
a computer with a Pentium 2.8-GHz CPU and 512 
Mbytes RAM. It took us roughly 46 ms on average to 
break a challenge in both the sample and test sets. 
Most failure cases in both sets occurred for the 
same reason: the failure of vertical segmentation led 
to partial results such as “S*****” and “******,” 
which matched too many candidate words with the 
same pixel sum in the dictionary. The only exception 
occurred to a sample in the test set in which the spell-
ing check failed to differentiate between the letters P 
and V because two alternative candidate words were 
both in the dictionary. 
Discussion
Our attack exploited the following fatal flaws in the 
target scheme:
It was easy to separate foreground text from back-•	
ground with an automatic program. 
The random shearing technique as implemented •	
was vulnerable to simple segmentation attacks. 
Constant and (almost) unique pixel counts for each •	
character often made it feasible to recognize a char-
acter by counting the number of foreground pixels 
in each segment.
English words used in the scheme made it vulner-•	
able to dictionary attacks. 
All three other Captchaservice.org schemes that used 
the random shearing distortion method were also vul-
nerable to the pixel-count attack. Our experiments 
suggested that they could be broken with almost 100 
percent success;4 some of these schemes used a dif-
ferent alphabet set, so we had to compile a revised 
pixel-count character lookup table for each of them. 
We also identified seven other schemes deployed on 
the Internet that were vulnerable to the pixel-count 
attack,4 including Bot Check, a popular Wordpress 
plug-in. The pixel-count method also contributed to 
our attack on the Microsoft CAPTCHA we described 
at the beginning of this article.2 In that attack, a seg-
ment’s pixel count didn’t identify which character the 
segment was, but it helped us determine whether the 
segment was a valid character or random noise.
However, not every font type is vulnerable to the 
pixel-count attack—for example, we tested fonts such 
as Arial, Courier, and Bell MT with a size of 16, 26, 
and 36 points, and none of them were susceptible 
because many characters in these typefaces have the 
same pixel count. So, a CAPTCHA can use a single 
font, but its designer should exercise caution to evalu-
ate that font’s suitability.
CAPTCHA designers have several simple methods 
to defeat our attack:
Make it hard to separate the text from the back-•	
ground—for example, use multiple colors for both 
foreground and background, leave no pattern that 
could help distinguish the foreground automatically, 
and include some foreground colors into the back-
ground and vice versa.
Make it hard to segment each image—for example, •	
connect characters with each other or add more 
cracks in each character.
Make it impossible to distinguish a character by •	
counting its pixels—for example, make all char-
acters have the same pixel count all the time. Or 
make a character have very different pixel counts 
in different challenges (if the difference isn’t large 
enough, an approximation method could probably 
determine each character). 
Random warping provides another good defense 
against the pixel count attack—for example, local 
warp can introduce “small ripples, waves, and elastic 
deformations along the pixels of the character”7 and 
global warp generates character-level, elastic defor-
mations; both can make a character’s pixel count less 
predictable. 
Furthermore, local warp can foil “feature-based 
algorithms, which may use character thickness or 
serif features to detect and recognise characters,”7 and 
global warp can foil template-matching algorithms 
for character detection and recognition. So, our work 
provides additional supporting evidence that it’s good 
practice to use warping (both local and global) for 
character distortion in CAPTCHAs.
T o sum up, a CAPTCHA that isn’t resistant to OCR software attacks is definitely insecure, but 
a CAPTCHA that is resistant to such attacks could 
still be vulnerable to (simple) customized attacks. 
 CAPTCHA creators should consider the simple but 
powerful attack presented in this article before de-
ploying a CAPTCHA.
It’s highly relevant at this time to develop a meth-
odology for evaluating CAPTCHA robustness—that 
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is, whether a scheme is robust enough to resist adver-
sarial attacks. This is still an open problem, and it’s a 
large part of our ongoing work. Given that hundreds 
of design variations exist, we doubt that a universal 
attack applicable to all CAPTCHAs is possible. Rath-
er, a more realistic expectation is to create a toolbox 
that includes attacks such as the one presented in this 
article. This toolbox will be able to not only bench-
mark CAPTCHA strength but also prevent design-
ers from making mistakes identifi ed in early research. 
Many lessons and experiences that early researchers 
learned failed to be applied to more recent designs 
for a simple reason: they weren’t readily accessible to 
current designers. An automated software tool will 
change this situation. 
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